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December 2, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 468th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, December 1, 1960

Present at the 468th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); Mr. John N. Irwin, II for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1 and 2); the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency (Item 1); the Director, National Science Foundation (Item 1); and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1). Also attending the Meeting were General Curtis LeMay for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Washburn); the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Dr. Walter Whitman, Department of State; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Eugene Skolnikoff, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; The Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

1. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES
(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(15))

Mr. Gray reported that last fall when the Council considered future NSC Agenda items, Dr. Kistiakovsky suggested that a Discussion Paper on international scientific activities might be useful. The Council approved looking into this possibility. The Planning Board considered several papers on the subject and decided that the most advisable procedure would be to ask Dr. Kistiakovsky to make an oral presentation, after which the Council would be asked to consider the draft NSC Action which had been

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC P89-1085
NLE Case 78-S935
By YLO NLE Dated 12/2/61

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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Soviet missile-space activity; developments in the Congo and Laos; and the current Moscow conference of Sino-Soviet Bloc leaders.

4. U.S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY
(NSC 5803; OCB Report on NSC 5803, dated November 2, 1960)

Mr. Harr summarized the reference report by the Operations Coordinating Board on U.S. Policy toward Germany, emphasizing the economic recovery of the country, its political stability, its build-up of military forces, and Adenauer's support for European integration. Mr. Harr said the OCB recommended a review of U.S. Policy toward Germany because the German situation was different in the three following respects from the situation which had obtained when the policy was adopted: (1) Berlin is now an active arena of struggle between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc; (2) U.S.-German relations have changed qualitatively; and (3) the U.S. has achieved its immediate post-war objectives in Germany and is now faced with a new generation of problems.

Mr. Dillon said he was concerned that a full-scale review of U.S. Policy toward Germany might have untoward effects if it became known to the public or to the Germans. Any leak of the fact that we were reviewing this policy would be disturbing to the Germans. He would prefer that we emphasize updating the German policy paper so that if the fact that the paper is being considered becomes known, we can say we are only updating the paper and not reviewing it.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, as summarized orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.
- b. Agreed that the statement of "U.S. Policy toward Germany" (NSC 5803) should be brought up to date by the NSC Planning Board, but that this action should not be interpreted as an overall substantive review of U.S. policy toward Germany.

were also aware that the USSR's wartime and postwar gains in Europe were closely bound to the future of Germany.

Since the Kremlin was unwilling to abandon the East German regime and indulge in serious negotiations, it established a long-range goal of forcing the West to accept the permanent partition of Germany and thereby to confirm the status quo in Eastern Europe. The final step in this policy was the crisis over Berlin, initiated by Khrushchev in his speech on 10 November 1958.

Bloc Tactics: 1955-1958

From late 1955 until Khrushchev's speech, the USSR and the GDR engaged in a determined effort to isolate West Berlin and erode the Western position. In the spring of 1956 the Soviet Union finally dissolved its Directorate of Border Controls and turned over full responsibility to the East Germans. Official statements that East Berlin was the capital of the GDR culminated in the Soviet answer to the Western protest over the parade of the East German troops in East Berlin on 1 May 1956. Having made its point that East Germany was sovereign in East Berlin, Moscow turned to the issue of nonmilitary access by the Western powers.

By November 1956 the USSR had forced through Soviet demands that only Allied personnel with appropriate travel orders were permitted to ride military trains. Soviet officials also insisted on the right to inspect these orders and the identity documents of military passengers, thus underlining their claim that the Allied trains were for use of the Berlin garrisons only.

Although in 1956 and 1957 the bloc was diverted by the serious problems arising from the Polish and Hungarian revolts, Soviet and East German officials continued to reinforce East German "sovereignty" by unilateral pronouncements and actions. In a joint statement in January 1957 the two governments noted that the air corridors were provisional and limited in character and did not affect the air sovereignty of the East Germans. By the end of the year the East Germans had advised foreign travelers that they would have to obtain East German visas to enter the GDR.

Allied diplomats previously had entered East Germany on the basis of Soviet passes. Despite Western protests, this rule was adhered to by the East Germans, with the result that Allied mission officials no longer visited the Soviet zone, and, in moving from West Germany to Berlin, had to use the military orders approved by the Russians for the Allied forces.

In 1958 the Kremlin again confirmed its position that East Berlin was the capital of East Germany, rejected Allied protests over military activity in East Berlin, and refused to intervene in the detention of a US Army car by East German police. At that time, the Soviet commandant made it clear that he was no longer the "sector commandant."

Within the Soviet zone, however, unrest and dissatisfaction reached levels reminiscent of 1953, and the number of refugees coming into West Berlin increased sharply. The loss of professional personnel, primarily doctors, was particularly galling to the East German regime.


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5. U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
(NSC 5726/1; OCB Report on NSC 5726/1, dated November 2, 1960)

Mr. Harr said this policy should be reviewed because of (1) the increasing ability of the Soviet Bloc to compete in civil aviation operations world-wide; (2) the actual participation of the USSR in international airline operations; (3) the increasing infiltration of the Soviet Bloc into the aviation program of the less-developed countries; and (4) the question of U.S. difficulties in the implementation of Paragraph 31 of the policy which deals with the development of programs designed to promote the Free World aviation position in the new under-developed areas.

Mr. Harr noted that the Department of Defense had expressed concern because the Soviet Union appeared to have a greater capability for delivering promptly to under-developed areas such civil aircraft as the latter needed. The OCB was currently endeavoring to inventory what the U.S. might do to meet this challenge. So far the U.S. had encountered delays and frustrations in financing provision of aircraft to under-developed countries.

Mr. Gray concluded the meeting by remarking that the Council might arrive at January 21, 1961 without having finished all the projects which it is now carrying on its agenda. The President said he thought there would be some problems left on January 21.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, as summarized orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.
- b. Agreed that "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc" (NSC 5726/1) should be reviewed by the NSC Planning Board, as recommended by the Operations Coordinating Board.



MARION W. BOGGS